[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"/blog/test-en":3,"/v1/social/getSocialPlatformList___en":8,"/blog/test-en___en___BLOG_POST":40,"/v1/website_terms_settings/list-all___en":71,"/admin_advice/get-by-permalink___en":86,"/author/profile___en":96,"/admin_advice/list_time___en":99},{"code":4,"message":5,"timestamp":6,"data":5,"success":7},"0",null,"2026-06-29 20:54:28",true,{"code":4,"message":5,"timestamp":6,"data":9,"success":7},[10,20,26,33],{"id":11,"name":12,"svgImage":13,"svgImageColours":14,"url":15,"isHide":16,"createBy":17,"createDate":18,"updateBy":17,"updateDate":19},2,"facebook","https://hl-file.8kds.com/admin/0911a812ca594df4abaf8e251cdbc79f.webp","https://hl-file.8kds.com/user/2063192546762428416.svg","https://www.facebook.com/people/Holinkdigitalsolusi-Holink/pfbid0uwTYocZaZT8RFPikTPyTU6wKaAa8zm9C44LqjMMpSwtEAnMk1LkkBuPyYnLgCMS3l/",0,1,1760508292449,1764150150048,{"id":21,"name":22,"svgImage":23,"svgImageColours":24,"url":25,"isHide":16,"createBy":17,"createDate":18,"updateBy":17,"updateDate":18},3,"Instagram","https://hl-file.8kds.com/admin/12fd7bcfe7cc4abb865c5076ac670041.webp","https://hl-file.8kds.com/user/2063193084358955008.svg","https://www.instagram.com/holink.id/saved/",{"id":27,"name":28,"svgImage":29,"svgImageColours":30,"url":31,"isHide":16,"createBy":17,"createDate":18,"updateBy":17,"updateDate":32},8,"TikTok","https://hl-file.8kds.com/admin/745140efbda646b392203ae099fcec2c.webp","https://hl-file.8kds.com/user/2063194267718914048.svg","https://tiktok.com",1781251475658,{"id":34,"name":35,"svgImage":36,"svgImageColours":37,"url":38,"isHide":16,"createBy":17,"createDate":18,"updateBy":17,"updateDate":39},12,"YouTuBe","https://hl-file.8kds.com/admin/bd669d52601b45029c21bc4a0fe9a373.webp","https://hl-file.8kds.com/user/2063194653750071296.svg","http://youtube.com",1766563964000,{"code":4,"message":5,"timestamp":6,"data":41,"success":7},{"id":42,"parentId":43,"parentType":44,"tdk":45,"meta":48,"social":54,"advanced":57,"schemas":59,"langPermalinks":60,"createdAt":69,"updatedAt":70},"2071565581343600640","2071565580882227200","BLOG_POST",{"isAddToMetaTitle":5,"title":46,"keywords":5,"permalink":47,"description":5},"test en","test-en",{"labels":49},[50],{"label":51,"type":52,"keyName":53,"metaDescription":53},"标签1","name","",{"facebook":55,"twitter":56},{"title":46,"description":53,"image":53},{"title":46,"description":53,"image":53,"useDataFromFacebook":7},{"robotsMeta":53,"canonicalUrl":58},"http://hotest.local/en/test-en/",[],[61,63,66],{"langCode":62,"permalink":47},"en",{"langCode":64,"permalink":65},"id","cms测试id",{"langCode":67,"permalink":68},"zh-CN","test-cn",1782734697,1782742935,{"code":4,"message":5,"timestamp":6,"data":72,"success":7},[73,76,79,82],{"id":74,"type":17,"permalink":75},"2008091676899291136","cookie设置",{"id":77,"type":11,"permalink":78},"2008091993644773376","cn-privacy-policy",{"id":80,"type":21,"permalink":81},"2008092243876941824","terms-conditions3",{"id":83,"type":84,"permalink":85},"2026842754595823616",4,"refund-policy",{"code":4,"message":5,"timestamp":6,"data":87,"success":7},{"id":43,"author":88,"title":46,"content":89,"classTypeId":90,"classTypeName":91,"publishStatus":17,"publishTime":92,"isHide":16,"sort":17,"coverImg":93,"createBy":94,"createDate":92,"updateBy":94,"updateDate":70,"pageTitle":5,"slug":5,"tagList":95,"authorAvatar":53,"authorBio":5},"cmstest","{\"time\":1782736256979,\"blocks\":[{\"id\":\"6bb5886f20\",\"type\":\"html\",\"data\":{\"fallbackHtml\":\"\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eAs G7 leaders restated their united support for Ukraine and vowed to increase economic pressure on Russia, President Vladimir Putin was hosting leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the ASEAN-Russia Commemorative Summit in Kazan. There, Putin could point to a very different diplomatic reality: none of the leaders present had severed ties with Russia or joined the West in treating it as an international pariah.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThis symbolic contrast is important. More than four years after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has not been isolated in the way many Western governments expected or hoped. Large parts of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America have continued to engage with Moscow.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThis is often out of strategic interest rather than sympathy: Russia remains a nuclear power, a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, a major energy exporter and a useful partner for states that do not want the West to define their strategic choices.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cblockquote class=\\\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\\\"\\u003e\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003ePutin’s Asian diplomacy should be taken seriously, but it has its limits.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003c/blockquote\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eBut the more important issue is whether Putin’s renewed diplomatic visibility represents a real comeback – or rather an attempt to compensate for Russia’s\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cpqpqx5qe40o\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noreferrer noopener\\\"\\u003elack of\\u0026nbsp;progress\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;in gaining international support for its position on Ukraine.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe Kremlin’s challenge is not that Russia has no partners. Putin’s visit to Beijing last month and the Kazan summit, which concluded on a commitment to deepen\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://asean.org/kazan-declaration-2026-asean-russian-federation-unity-in-diversity-35-years-together/\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noreferrer noopener\\\"\\u003eASEAN-Russia\\u0026nbsp;cooperation,\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;gave Putin political platforms and opportunities to bolster his status. But these partnerships cannot deliver Putin’s priority goal: a political settlement on Ukraine on Russia’s terms.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eUkraine remains stuck\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003ePutin’s failure to respond meaningfully to Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vidkritij-list-prezidentu-rosijskoyi-federaciyi-vid-preziden-104769\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noreferrer noopener\\\"\\u003eopen\\u0026nbsp;letter\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;and invitation to meet is revealing. The Kremlin still appears to believe its ‘strategy’ of endurance will deliver its war aims: hold the line, grind forward where possible, wait out political cycles in the West, and reserve the option of diplomacy for only once the terms have shifted decisively in Russia’s favour.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThere is a brutal logic to this. Russia has shown that it can sustain a long war. Western support for Ukraine remains politically fragile and the US is increasingly unpredictable. European military production is improving, but not yet at the scale required to transform the war quickly.\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/06/hungarys-reset-ukraine-good-news-european-deterrence\\\"\\u003eRelated workHungary’s reset with Ukraine is good news for European deterrence\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eHowever, Russia’s endurance has not produced a diplomatic breakthrough. It has so far failed at forcing Ukraine to accept its territorial claims. It has not split the G7 either. And it has not persuaded China, India or ASEAN states to endorse its preferred endgame. The result is that while Russia looks less isolated globally, it has not been able to persuade others to support its position on Ukraine, its most important – if not existential – issue.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThis is why the recent\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.politico.eu/article/antonio-costa-eu-council-russia-backchannel-ukraine-peace-talks/\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noreferrer noopener\\\"\\u003eEuropean\\u0026nbsp;debate\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;over opening communication channels with the Kremlin matters. These discussions do not amount to reconciliation. Instead, they show that Europeans are preparing for the diplomatic phase of a long war – even if they disagree between themselves over who should conduct this diplomacy and on what basis.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eFor Moscow, such debate can usefully be presented domestically and internationally as evidence that Europe is slowly realizing it can’t isolate Russia forever. But, in reality, Europe is not preparing to go back to business as usual. It is trying to avoid being excluded from any eventual negotiation while simultaneously rearming, hardening its eastern flank and reducing long-term dependence on Russia.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eChina’s role\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003ePutin’s visit to Beijing in May confirmed China’s central importance to Russia’s wartime resilience. China has become\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/05/china-and-russias-strategic-duo-endures-its-limits-are-clear\\\"\\u003eRussia’s indispensable economic partner:\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;a buyer of Russian oil and gas, a supplier of industrial goods and a channel through which Moscow can blunt the impact of Western sanctions.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eBut the Russia–China relationship is not a coalition for victory in Ukraine. Beijing has every interest in Russia distracting the US, weakening Western unity and accelerating the transition towards a more fragmented international order. It has far less interest in being dragged into Russia’s war or absorbing the costs of a direct confrontation with the West over Ukraine.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThis distinction is crucial. China helps Russia to endure. But it does not help Russia win diplomatically.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cblockquote class=\\\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\\\"\\u003e\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe Russia–China relationship is not a coalition for victory in Ukraine.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003c/blockquote\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eIn fact, the war has made Russia more dependent on China at precisely the moment when Moscow wants to present itself as an independent pole in a multipolar world. The Kremlin can speak of strategic partnership, but the asymmetry is obvious. Russia needs China economically. China values Russia as a useful partner, but not as an equal strategic centre.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThis limits what Putin’s Beijing diplomacy can achieve. It demonstrates that Russia cannot be excluded from Eurasian politics. It does not demonstrate that Moscow can shape the terms of peace in Europe.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eThe Kazan summit\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe ASEAN summit offered a broader test of Russia’s influence in Asia. It shows neither a Russian collapse nor a comeback.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eFor countries seeking to avoid binary choices between Washington and Beijing, maintaining relations with Russia still has value. Russia has long-standing defence ties with several Asian states, important energy roles, and diplomatic weight at the UN. Some governments may also value Moscow as a partner that does not attach liberal political conditions to cooperation.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eBut the quality of Russia’s influence has changed. Before 2022, Moscow could claim to be an autonomous great power in Asia: a third pole alternative to the US and China with military, diplomatic, cultural, political and technological influence.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/05/china-and-russias-strategic-duo-endures-its-limits-are-clear\\\"\\u003eRelated workChina and Russia’s strategic duo endures – but its limits are clear\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe war has weakened that claim. Russia’s defence industry is consumed by Ukraine. Sanctions complicate payments, logistics and technology transfers. Its diplomatic bandwidth is heavily absorbed by the war.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eMost importantly, its growing dependence on China makes it harder for Asian states to see Moscow as a true counterweight to Beijing. This is especially important in Southeast Asia. ASEAN states do not want to choose between the US and China.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eBut nor are they looking to join a Russian camp. They will trade with Moscow, buy from Moscow where useful, and engage Moscow when it serves their interests. This engagement shows Russia is not isolated, but it does not reflect Russian leadership.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eRussia collecting herself?\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003ePutin’s Asian diplomacy should be taken seriously, but it has its limits.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe West’s failure to isolate Russia globally is a real achievement for Moscow. But while Russia’s partners may reject the Western pressure to isolate Moscow, most of them have not endorsed Russia’s war aims. They are preserving options, not joining a project. They are engaging Russia because it is useful, not because they want Russia to define the future of European security.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eRegions\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cul class=\\\"wp-block-list\\\"\\u003e\\n\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/regions/russia-and-eurasia/russia\\\"\\u003eRussia\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/regions/russia-and-eurasia/ukraine\\\"\\u003eUkraine\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/regions/asia-pacific/southeast-asia\\\"\\u003eSoutheast Asia\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\n\\u003c/ul\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eDepartments\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cul class=\\\"wp-block-list\\\"\\u003e\\n\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/our-departments-and-programmes/russia-and-eurasia-programme\\\"\\u003eRussia and Eurasia Programme\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\n\\u003c/ul\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eSubscribe to our weekly newsletter\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eOur flagship email provides a round-up of content, plus the latest on events and how to connect with the institute.Enter emailSubscribe\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eArticle second half\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThat is the limit of Putin’s diplomatic offensive. It gives Russia oxygen, legitimacy and visibility. But it does not resolve the central strategic contradiction of Russian foreign policy: Moscow wants to use the wider non-Western world to compensate for a war that continues to define, constrain and poison its international position.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eWhen Russia found itself weakened after the Crimean War (1853-1856), Tsar Alexander II’s Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov famously wrote: ‘Russia is said to be sulking. Russia is not sulking, she is collecting herself’.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003ePutin may hope his turn to Asia will one day be seen in similar terms. But there is a profound difference: however successful Russia’s diplomacy in Beijing or ASEAN may appear, it cannot find a way out of its Ukraine quagmire. Ultimately, this may prevent Moscow from turning its diplomatic presence into strategic renewal, if not political survival.\\u003c/p\\u003e\",\"fallbackText\":\"As G7 leaders restated their united support for Ukraine and vowed to increase economic pressure on Russia, President Vladimir Putin was hosting leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the ASEAN-Russia Commemorative Summit in Kazan. There, Putin could point to a very different diplomatic reality: none of the leaders present had severed ties with Russia or joined the West in treating it as an international pariah.\\nThis symbolic contrast is important. More than four years after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has not been isolated in the way many Western governments expected or hoped. Large parts of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America have continued to engage with Moscow. \\nThis is often out of strategic interest rather than sympathy: Russia remains a nuclear power, a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, a major energy exporter and a useful partner for states that do not want the West to define their strategic choices.\\nPutin’s Asian diplomacy should be taken seriously, but it has its limits. \\nBut the more important issue is whether Putin’s renewed diplomatic visibility represents a real comeback – or rather an attempt to compensate for Russia’s lack of progress in gaining international support for its position on Ukraine.\\nThe Kremlin’s challenge is not that Russia has no partners. Putin’s visit to Beijing last month and the Kazan summit, which concluded on a commitment to deepen ASEAN-Russia cooperation, gave Putin political platforms and opportunities to bolster his status. But these partnerships cannot deliver Putin’s priority goal: a political settlement on Ukraine on Russia’s terms.\\nUkraine remains stuck\\nPutin’s failure to respond meaningfully to Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s open letter and invitation to meet is revealing. The Kremlin still appears to believe its ‘strategy’ of endurance will deliver its war aims: hold the line, grind forward where possible, wait out political cycles in the West, and reserve the option of diplomacy for only once the terms have shifted decisively in Russia’s favour.\\nThere is a brutal logic to this. Russia has shown that it can sustain a long war. Western support for Ukraine remains politically fragile and the US is increasingly unpredictable. European military production is improving, but not yet at the scale required to transform the war quickly.Related workHungary’s reset with Ukraine is good news for European deterrence \\nHowever, Russia’s endurance has not produced a diplomatic breakthrough. It has so far failed at forcing Ukraine to accept its territorial claims. It has not split the G7 either. And it has not persuaded China, India or ASEAN states to endorse its preferred endgame. The result is that while Russia looks less isolated globally, it has not been able to persuade others to support its position on Ukraine, its most important – if not existential – issue. \\nThis is why the recent European debate over opening communication channels with the Kremlin matters. These discussions do not amount to reconciliation. Instead, they show that Europeans are preparing for the diplomatic phase of a long war – even if they disagree between themselves over who should conduct this diplomacy and on what basis.\\nFor Moscow, such debate can usefully be presented domestically and internationally as evidence that Europe is slowly realizing it can’t isolate Russia forever. But, in reality, Europe is not preparing to go back to business as usual. It is trying to avoid being excluded from any eventual negotiation while simultaneously rearming, hardening its eastern flank and reducing long-term dependence on Russia. \\nChina’s role\\nPutin’s visit to Beijing in May confirmed China’s central importance to Russia’s wartime resilience. China has become Russia’s indispensable economic partner: a buyer of Russian oil and gas, a supplier of industrial goods and a channel through which Moscow can blunt the impact of Western sanctions.\\nBut the Russia–China relationship is not a coalition for victory in Ukraine. Beijing has every interest in Russia distracting the US, weakening Western unity and accelerating the transition towards a more fragmented international order. It has far less interest in being dragged into Russia’s war or absorbing the costs of a direct confrontation with the West over Ukraine.\\nThis distinction is crucial. China helps Russia to endure. But it does not help Russia win diplomatically.\\nThe Russia–China relationship is not a coalition for victory in Ukraine.\\nIn fact, the war has made Russia more dependent on China at precisely the moment when Moscow wants to present itself as an independent pole in a multipolar world. The Kremlin can speak of strategic partnership, but the asymmetry is obvious. Russia needs China economically. China values Russia as a useful partner, but not as an equal strategic centre.\\nThis limits what Putin’s Beijing diplomacy can achieve. It demonstrates that Russia cannot be excluded from Eurasian politics. It does not demonstrate that Moscow can shape the terms of peace in Europe.\\nThe Kazan summit\\nThe ASEAN summit offered a broader test of Russia’s influence in Asia. It shows neither a Russian collapse nor a comeback.\\nFor countries seeking to avoid binary choices between Washington and Beijing, maintaining relations with Russia still has value. Russia has long-standing defence ties with several Asian states, important energy roles, and diplomatic weight at the UN. Some governments may also value Moscow as a partner that does not attach liberal political conditions to cooperation. \\nBut the quality of Russia’s influence has changed. Before 2022, Moscow could claim to be an autonomous great power in Asia: a third pole alternative to the US and China with military, diplomatic, cultural, political and technological influence. Related workChina and Russia’s strategic duo endures – but its limits are clear\\nThe war has weakened that claim. Russia’s defence industry is consumed by Ukraine. Sanctions complicate payments, logistics and technology transfers. Its diplomatic bandwidth is heavily absorbed by the war. \\nMost importantly, its growing dependence on China makes it harder for Asian states to see Moscow as a true counterweight to Beijing. This is especially important in Southeast Asia. ASEAN states do not want to choose between the US and China. \\nBut nor are they looking to join a Russian camp. They will trade with Moscow, buy from Moscow where useful, and engage Moscow when it serves their interests. This engagement shows Russia is not isolated, but it does not reflect Russian leadership. \\nRussia collecting herself?\\nPutin’s Asian diplomacy should be taken seriously, but it has its limits. \\nThe West’s failure to isolate Russia globally is a real achievement for Moscow. But while Russia’s partners may reject the Western pressure to isolate Moscow, most of them have not endorsed Russia’s war aims. They are preserving options, not joining a project. They are engaging Russia because it is useful, not because they want Russia to define the future of European security.\\nRegions\\nRussia\\nUkraine\\nSoutheast Asia\\nDepartments\\nRussia and Eurasia Programme\\nSubscribe to our weekly newsletter\\nOur flagship email provides a round-up of content, plus the latest on events and how to connect with the institute.Enter emailSubscribe\\nArticle second half\\nThat is the limit of Putin’s diplomatic offensive. It gives Russia oxygen, legitimacy and visibility. But it does not resolve the central strategic contradiction of Russian foreign policy: Moscow wants to use the wider non-Western world to compensate for a war that continues to define, constrain and poison its international position.\\nWhen Russia found itself weakened after the Crimean War (1853-1856), Tsar Alexander II’s Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov famously wrote: ‘Russia is said to be sulking. Russia is not sulking, she is collecting herself’. \\nPutin may hope his turn to Asia will one day be seen in similar terms. But there is a profound difference: however successful Russia’s diplomacy in Beijing or ASEAN may appear, it cannot find a way out of its Ukraine quagmire. Ultimately, this may prevent Moscow from turning its diplomatic presence into strategic renewal, if not political survival.\",\"html\":\"\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eAs G7 leaders restated their united support for Ukraine and vowed to increase economic pressure on Russia, President Vladimir Putin was hosting leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the ASEAN-Russia Commemorative Summit in Kazan. There, Putin could point to a very different diplomatic reality: none of the leaders present had severed ties with Russia or joined the West in treating it as an international pariah.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThis symbolic contrast is important. More than four years after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has not been isolated in the way many Western governments expected or hoped. Large parts of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America have continued to engage with Moscow.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThis is often out of strategic interest rather than sympathy: Russia remains a nuclear power, a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, a major energy exporter and a useful partner for states that do not want the West to define their strategic choices.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cblockquote class=\\\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\\\"\\u003e\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003ePutin’s Asian diplomacy should be taken seriously, but it has its limits.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003c/blockquote\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eBut the more important issue is whether Putin’s renewed diplomatic visibility represents a real comeback – or rather an attempt to compensate for Russia’s\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cpqpqx5qe40o\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noreferrer noopener\\\"\\u003elack of\\u0026nbsp;progress\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;in gaining international support for its position on Ukraine.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe Kremlin’s challenge is not that Russia has no partners. Putin’s visit to Beijing last month and the Kazan summit, which concluded on a commitment to deepen\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://asean.org/kazan-declaration-2026-asean-russian-federation-unity-in-diversity-35-years-together/\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noreferrer noopener\\\"\\u003eASEAN-Russia\\u0026nbsp;cooperation,\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;gave Putin political platforms and opportunities to bolster his status. But these partnerships cannot deliver Putin’s priority goal: a political settlement on Ukraine on Russia’s terms.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eUkraine remains stuck\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003ePutin’s failure to respond meaningfully to Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vidkritij-list-prezidentu-rosijskoyi-federaciyi-vid-preziden-104769\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noreferrer noopener\\\"\\u003eopen\\u0026nbsp;letter\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;and invitation to meet is revealing. The Kremlin still appears to believe its ‘strategy’ of endurance will deliver its war aims: hold the line, grind forward where possible, wait out political cycles in the West, and reserve the option of diplomacy for only once the terms have shifted decisively in Russia’s favour.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThere is a brutal logic to this. Russia has shown that it can sustain a long war. Western support for Ukraine remains politically fragile and the US is increasingly unpredictable. European military production is improving, but not yet at the scale required to transform the war quickly.\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/06/hungarys-reset-ukraine-good-news-european-deterrence\\\"\\u003eRelated workHungary’s reset with Ukraine is good news for European deterrence\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eHowever, Russia’s endurance has not produced a diplomatic breakthrough. It has so far failed at forcing Ukraine to accept its territorial claims. It has not split the G7 either. And it has not persuaded China, India or ASEAN states to endorse its preferred endgame. The result is that while Russia looks less isolated globally, it has not been able to persuade others to support its position on Ukraine, its most important – if not existential – issue.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThis is why the recent\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.politico.eu/article/antonio-costa-eu-council-russia-backchannel-ukraine-peace-talks/\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noreferrer noopener\\\"\\u003eEuropean\\u0026nbsp;debate\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;over opening communication channels with the Kremlin matters. These discussions do not amount to reconciliation. Instead, they show that Europeans are preparing for the diplomatic phase of a long war – even if they disagree between themselves over who should conduct this diplomacy and on what basis.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eFor Moscow, such debate can usefully be presented domestically and internationally as evidence that Europe is slowly realizing it can’t isolate Russia forever. But, in reality, Europe is not preparing to go back to business as usual. It is trying to avoid being excluded from any eventual negotiation while simultaneously rearming, hardening its eastern flank and reducing long-term dependence on Russia.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eChina’s role\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003ePutin’s visit to Beijing in May confirmed China’s central importance to Russia’s wartime resilience. China has become\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/05/china-and-russias-strategic-duo-endures-its-limits-are-clear\\\"\\u003eRussia’s indispensable economic partner:\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;a buyer of Russian oil and gas, a supplier of industrial goods and a channel through which Moscow can blunt the impact of Western sanctions.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eBut the Russia–China relationship is not a coalition for victory in Ukraine. Beijing has every interest in Russia distracting the US, weakening Western unity and accelerating the transition towards a more fragmented international order. It has far less interest in being dragged into Russia’s war or absorbing the costs of a direct confrontation with the West over Ukraine.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThis distinction is crucial. China helps Russia to endure. But it does not help Russia win diplomatically.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cblockquote class=\\\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\\\"\\u003e\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe Russia–China relationship is not a coalition for victory in Ukraine.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003c/blockquote\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eIn fact, the war has made Russia more dependent on China at precisely the moment when Moscow wants to present itself as an independent pole in a multipolar world. The Kremlin can speak of strategic partnership, but the asymmetry is obvious. Russia needs China economically. China values Russia as a useful partner, but not as an equal strategic centre.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThis limits what Putin’s Beijing diplomacy can achieve. It demonstrates that Russia cannot be excluded from Eurasian politics. It does not demonstrate that Moscow can shape the terms of peace in Europe.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eThe Kazan summit\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe ASEAN summit offered a broader test of Russia’s influence in Asia. It shows neither a Russian collapse nor a comeback.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eFor countries seeking to avoid binary choices between Washington and Beijing, maintaining relations with Russia still has value. Russia has long-standing defence ties with several Asian states, important energy roles, and diplomatic weight at the UN. Some governments may also value Moscow as a partner that does not attach liberal political conditions to cooperation.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eBut the quality of Russia’s influence has changed. Before 2022, Moscow could claim to be an autonomous great power in Asia: a third pole alternative to the US and China with military, diplomatic, cultural, political and technological influence.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/05/china-and-russias-strategic-duo-endures-its-limits-are-clear\\\"\\u003eRelated workChina and Russia’s strategic duo endures – but its limits are clear\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe war has weakened that claim. Russia’s defence industry is consumed by Ukraine. Sanctions complicate payments, logistics and technology transfers. Its diplomatic bandwidth is heavily absorbed by the war.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eMost importantly, its growing dependence on China makes it harder for Asian states to see Moscow as a true counterweight to Beijing. This is especially important in Southeast Asia. ASEAN states do not want to choose between the US and China.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eBut nor are they looking to join a Russian camp. They will trade with Moscow, buy from Moscow where useful, and engage Moscow when it serves their interests. This engagement shows Russia is not isolated, but it does not reflect Russian leadership.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eRussia collecting herself?\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003ePutin’s Asian diplomacy should be taken seriously, but it has its limits.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe West’s failure to isolate Russia globally is a real achievement for Moscow. But while Russia’s partners may reject the Western pressure to isolate Moscow, most of them have not endorsed Russia’s war aims. They are preserving options, not joining a project. They are engaging Russia because it is useful, not because they want Russia to define the future of European security.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eRegions\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cul class=\\\"wp-block-list\\\"\\u003e\\n\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/regions/russia-and-eurasia/russia\\\"\\u003eRussia\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/regions/russia-and-eurasia/ukraine\\\"\\u003eUkraine\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/regions/asia-pacific/southeast-asia\\\"\\u003eSoutheast Asia\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\n\\u003c/ul\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eDepartments\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cul class=\\\"wp-block-list\\\"\\u003e\\n\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/our-departments-and-programmes/russia-and-eurasia-programme\\\"\\u003eRussia and Eurasia Programme\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\n\\u003c/ul\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eSubscribe to our weekly newsletter\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eOur flagship email provides a round-up of content, plus the latest on events and how to connect with the institute.Enter emailSubscribe\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eArticle second half\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThat is the limit of Putin’s diplomatic offensive. It gives Russia oxygen, legitimacy and visibility. But it does not resolve the central strategic contradiction of Russian foreign policy: Moscow wants to use the wider non-Western world to compensate for a war that continues to define, constrain and poison its international position.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eWhen Russia found itself weakened after the Crimean War (1853-1856), Tsar Alexander II’s Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov famously wrote: ‘Russia is said to be sulking. Russia is not sulking, she is collecting herself’.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003ePutin may hope his turn to Asia will one day be seen in similar terms. But there is a profound difference: however successful Russia’s diplomacy in Beijing or ASEAN may appear, it cannot find a way out of its Ukraine quagmire. Ultimately, this may prevent Moscow from turning its diplomatic presence into strategic renewal, if not political survival.\\u003c/p\\u003e\",\"text\":\"\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eAs G7 leaders restated their united support for Ukraine and vowed to increase economic pressure on Russia, President Vladimir Putin was hosting leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the ASEAN-Russia Commemorative Summit in Kazan. There, Putin could point to a very different diplomatic reality: none of the leaders present had severed ties with Russia or joined the West in treating it as an international pariah.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThis symbolic contrast is important. More than four years after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has not been isolated in the way many Western governments expected or hoped. Large parts of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America have continued to engage with Moscow.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThis is often out of strategic interest rather than sympathy: Russia remains a nuclear power, a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, a major energy exporter and a useful partner for states that do not want the West to define their strategic choices.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cblockquote class=\\\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\\\"\\u003e\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003ePutin’s Asian diplomacy should be taken seriously, but it has its limits.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003c/blockquote\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eBut the more important issue is whether Putin’s renewed diplomatic visibility represents a real comeback – or rather an attempt to compensate for Russia’s\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cpqpqx5qe40o\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noreferrer noopener\\\"\\u003elack of\\u0026nbsp;progress\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;in gaining international support for its position on Ukraine.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe Kremlin’s challenge is not that Russia has no partners. Putin’s visit to Beijing last month and the Kazan summit, which concluded on a commitment to deepen\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://asean.org/kazan-declaration-2026-asean-russian-federation-unity-in-diversity-35-years-together/\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noreferrer noopener\\\"\\u003eASEAN-Russia\\u0026nbsp;cooperation,\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;gave Putin political platforms and opportunities to bolster his status. But these partnerships cannot deliver Putin’s priority goal: a political settlement on Ukraine on Russia’s terms.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eUkraine remains stuck\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003ePutin’s failure to respond meaningfully to Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vidkritij-list-prezidentu-rosijskoyi-federaciyi-vid-preziden-104769\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noreferrer noopener\\\"\\u003eopen\\u0026nbsp;letter\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;and invitation to meet is revealing. The Kremlin still appears to believe its ‘strategy’ of endurance will deliver its war aims: hold the line, grind forward where possible, wait out political cycles in the West, and reserve the option of diplomacy for only once the terms have shifted decisively in Russia’s favour.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThere is a brutal logic to this. Russia has shown that it can sustain a long war. Western support for Ukraine remains politically fragile and the US is increasingly unpredictable. European military production is improving, but not yet at the scale required to transform the war quickly.\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/06/hungarys-reset-ukraine-good-news-european-deterrence\\\"\\u003eRelated workHungary’s reset with Ukraine is good news for European deterrence\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eHowever, Russia’s endurance has not produced a diplomatic breakthrough. It has so far failed at forcing Ukraine to accept its territorial claims. It has not split the G7 either. And it has not persuaded China, India or ASEAN states to endorse its preferred endgame. The result is that while Russia looks less isolated globally, it has not been able to persuade others to support its position on Ukraine, its most important – if not existential – issue.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThis is why the recent\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.politico.eu/article/antonio-costa-eu-council-russia-backchannel-ukraine-peace-talks/\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noreferrer noopener\\\"\\u003eEuropean\\u0026nbsp;debate\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;over opening communication channels with the Kremlin matters. These discussions do not amount to reconciliation. Instead, they show that Europeans are preparing for the diplomatic phase of a long war – even if they disagree between themselves over who should conduct this diplomacy and on what basis.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eFor Moscow, such debate can usefully be presented domestically and internationally as evidence that Europe is slowly realizing it can’t isolate Russia forever. But, in reality, Europe is not preparing to go back to business as usual. It is trying to avoid being excluded from any eventual negotiation while simultaneously rearming, hardening its eastern flank and reducing long-term dependence on Russia.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eChina’s role\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003ePutin’s visit to Beijing in May confirmed China’s central importance to Russia’s wartime resilience. China has become\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/05/china-and-russias-strategic-duo-endures-its-limits-are-clear\\\"\\u003eRussia’s indispensable economic partner:\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;a buyer of Russian oil and gas, a supplier of industrial goods and a channel through which Moscow can blunt the impact of Western sanctions.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eBut the Russia–China relationship is not a coalition for victory in Ukraine. Beijing has every interest in Russia distracting the US, weakening Western unity and accelerating the transition towards a more fragmented international order. It has far less interest in being dragged into Russia’s war or absorbing the costs of a direct confrontation with the West over Ukraine.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThis distinction is crucial. China helps Russia to endure. But it does not help Russia win diplomatically.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cblockquote class=\\\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\\\"\\u003e\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe Russia–China relationship is not a coalition for victory in Ukraine.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003c/blockquote\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eIn fact, the war has made Russia more dependent on China at precisely the moment when Moscow wants to present itself as an independent pole in a multipolar world. The Kremlin can speak of strategic partnership, but the asymmetry is obvious. Russia needs China economically. China values Russia as a useful partner, but not as an equal strategic centre.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThis limits what Putin’s Beijing diplomacy can achieve. It demonstrates that Russia cannot be excluded from Eurasian politics. It does not demonstrate that Moscow can shape the terms of peace in Europe.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eThe Kazan summit\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe ASEAN summit offered a broader test of Russia’s influence in Asia. It shows neither a Russian collapse nor a comeback.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eFor countries seeking to avoid binary choices between Washington and Beijing, maintaining relations with Russia still has value. Russia has long-standing defence ties with several Asian states, important energy roles, and diplomatic weight at the UN. Some governments may also value Moscow as a partner that does not attach liberal political conditions to cooperation.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eBut the quality of Russia’s influence has changed. Before 2022, Moscow could claim to be an autonomous great power in Asia: a third pole alternative to the US and China with military, diplomatic, cultural, political and technological influence.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/05/china-and-russias-strategic-duo-endures-its-limits-are-clear\\\"\\u003eRelated workChina and Russia’s strategic duo endures – but its limits are clear\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe war has weakened that claim. Russia’s defence industry is consumed by Ukraine. Sanctions complicate payments, logistics and technology transfers. Its diplomatic bandwidth is heavily absorbed by the war.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eMost importantly, its growing dependence on China makes it harder for Asian states to see Moscow as a true counterweight to Beijing. This is especially important in Southeast Asia. ASEAN states do not want to choose between the US and China.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eBut nor are they looking to join a Russian camp. They will trade with Moscow, buy from Moscow where useful, and engage Moscow when it serves their interests. This engagement shows Russia is not isolated, but it does not reflect Russian leadership.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eRussia collecting herself?\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003ePutin’s Asian diplomacy should be taken seriously, but it has its limits.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe West’s failure to isolate Russia globally is a real achievement for Moscow. But while Russia’s partners may reject the Western pressure to isolate Moscow, most of them have not endorsed Russia’s war aims. They are preserving options, not joining a project. They are engaging Russia because it is useful, not because they want Russia to define the future of European security.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eRegions\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cul class=\\\"wp-block-list\\\"\\u003e\\n\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/regions/russia-and-eurasia/russia\\\"\\u003eRussia\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/regions/russia-and-eurasia/ukraine\\\"\\u003eUkraine\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/regions/asia-pacific/southeast-asia\\\"\\u003eSoutheast Asia\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\n\\u003c/ul\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eDepartments\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cul class=\\\"wp-block-list\\\"\\u003e\\n\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003ca href=\\\"https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/our-departments-and-programmes/russia-and-eurasia-programme\\\"\\u003eRussia and Eurasia Programme\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\n\\u003c/ul\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eSubscribe to our weekly newsletter\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eOur flagship email provides a round-up of content, plus the latest on events and how to connect with the institute.Enter emailSubscribe\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch2 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eArticle second half\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThat is the limit of Putin’s diplomatic offensive. It gives Russia oxygen, legitimacy and visibility. But it does not resolve the central strategic contradiction of Russian foreign policy: Moscow wants to use the wider non-Western world to compensate for a war that continues to define, constrain and poison its international position.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eWhen Russia found itself weakened after the Crimean War (1853-1856), Tsar Alexander II’s Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov famously wrote: ‘Russia is said to be sulking. Russia is not sulking, she is collecting herself’.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003ePutin may hope his turn to Asia will one day be seen in similar terms. But there is a profound difference: however successful Russia’s diplomacy in Beijing or ASEAN may appear, it cannot find a way out of its Ukraine quagmire. Ultimately, this may prevent Moscow from turning its diplomatic presence into strategic renewal, if not political survival.\\u003c/p\\u003e\"}}],\"version\":\"2.30.0\"}",33,"Create Your Account",1782734696,"https://hl-file.8kds.com/admin/4a699b7145e24f049704dbec9483a084.png",162,[],{"code":4,"message":5,"timestamp":6,"data":97,"success":7},{"userId":94,"nickname":88,"avatar":53,"bio":5,"socialLinks":98,"blogPostCount":11,"helpCenterCount":16},[],{"code":4,"message":5,"timestamp":6,"data":100,"success":7},{"records":101,"total":120,"size":21,"current":17,"orders":121,"searchCount":7,"pages":21},[102,103,111],{"id":43,"author":88,"title":46,"content":89,"classTypeId":90,"classTypeName":91,"publishTime":92,"coverImg":93,"pageTitle":5,"slug":5,"permalink":47,"authorAvatar":53,"authorBio":5,"createBy":94,"updateDate":70},{"id":104,"author":88,"title":105,"content":106,"classTypeId":90,"classTypeName":91,"publishTime":107,"coverImg":108,"pageTitle":5,"slug":5,"permalink":109,"authorAvatar":53,"authorBio":5,"createBy":94,"updateDate":110},"2071454084864204800","test","{\"time\":1782734713020,\"blocks\":[{\"id\":\"8ecac73e7a\",\"type\":\"html\",\"data\":{\"fallbackHtml\":\"\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003een \\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cfigure class=\\\"wp-block-image\\\"\\u003e\\u003ca class=\\\"td-modal-image\\\" href=\\\"https://uspolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/maxresdefault.jpg\\\"\\u003e\\u003cimg decoding=\\\"async\\\" src=\\\"https://uspolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/maxresdefault-696x392.jpg\\\" alt=\\\"\\\" title=\\\"maxresdefault\\\"/\\u003e\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/figure\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eAs lawmakers continue debating rail policy, a new video from US Policy examines an important question: Do additional federal regulations make railroads safer, or do they primarily increase costs and reduce efficiency?\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eUsing a model train set to illustrate the point, the video explores how each new mandate can add friction to the freight system through compliance costs, staffing requirements, and restrictions on innovation.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cfigure class=\\\"wp-block-embed\\\"\\u003e\\u003cdiv class=\\\"wp-block-embed__wrapper\\\"\\u003e\\u003ciframe src=\\\"https://www.youtube.com/embed/oaIk7TD5Yjg\\\" loading=\\\"lazy\\\" allow=\\\"accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share\\\" referrerpolicy=\\\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\\\" allowfullscreen\\u003e\\u003c/iframe\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003c/figure\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe video highlights concerns with provisions often associated with the Railway Safety Act, including two-person crew mandates and expanded regulatory requirements. While advocates argue these measures are necessary to prevent accidents, the video notes that freight rail companies already face significant financial incentives to prioritize safety, including the costs associated with derailments, insurance claims, cargo losses, and reputational damage.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe video also places the debate in historical context, noting that rail deregulation efforts beginning under President Jimmy Carter helped create a more efficient and financially sustainable freight rail system. Greater flexibility allowed railroads to invest in infrastructure, improve service, and strengthen supply chains.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe broader economic implications are significant. When rail transportation becomes less efficient or more expensive, freight often shifts to trucks, increasing highway congestion, road wear, and overall transportation costs.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eUltimately, the video argues that the debate should not be framed as safety versus no safety. Instead, policymakers should focus on identifying the most effective ways to improve safety while preserving the flexibility, innovation, and efficiency that make freight rail an essential part of the American economy.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch3 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eKey Takeaway\\u003c/h3\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe question is not whether railroads should be safe—they must be. The question is whether one-size-fits-all federal mandates are the best way to achieve that goal, or whether they risk increasing costs and slowing innovation without delivering meaningful safety improvements.\\u003c/p\\u003e\",\"fallbackText\":\"en \\nAs lawmakers continue debating rail policy, a new video from US Policy examines an important question: Do additional federal regulations make railroads safer, or do they primarily increase costs and reduce efficiency?\\nUsing a model train set to illustrate the point, the video explores how each new mandate can add friction to the freight system through compliance costs, staffing requirements, and restrictions on innovation.\\nThe video highlights concerns with provisions often associated with the Railway Safety Act, including two-person crew mandates and expanded regulatory requirements. While advocates argue these measures are necessary to prevent accidents, the video notes that freight rail companies already face significant financial incentives to prioritize safety, including the costs associated with derailments, insurance claims, cargo losses, and reputational damage.\\nThe video also places the debate in historical context, noting that rail deregulation efforts beginning under President Jimmy Carter helped create a more efficient and financially sustainable freight rail system. Greater flexibility allowed railroads to invest in infrastructure, improve service, and strengthen supply chains.\\nThe broader economic implications are significant. When rail transportation becomes less efficient or more expensive, freight often shifts to trucks, increasing highway congestion, road wear, and overall transportation costs.\\nUltimately, the video argues that the debate should not be framed as safety versus no safety. Instead, policymakers should focus on identifying the most effective ways to improve safety while preserving the flexibility, innovation, and efficiency that make freight rail an essential part of the American economy.\\nKey Takeaway\\nThe question is not whether railroads should be safe—they must be. The question is whether one-size-fits-all federal mandates are the best way to achieve that goal, or whether they risk increasing costs and slowing innovation without delivering meaningful safety improvements.\",\"html\":\"\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003een \\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cfigure class=\\\"wp-block-image\\\"\\u003e\\u003ca class=\\\"td-modal-image\\\" href=\\\"https://uspolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/maxresdefault.jpg\\\"\\u003e\\u003cimg decoding=\\\"async\\\" src=\\\"https://uspolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/maxresdefault-696x392.jpg\\\" alt=\\\"\\\" title=\\\"maxresdefault\\\"/\\u003e\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/figure\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eAs lawmakers continue debating rail policy, a new video from US Policy examines an important question: Do additional federal regulations make railroads safer, or do they primarily increase costs and reduce efficiency?\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eUsing a model train set to illustrate the point, the video explores how each new mandate can add friction to the freight system through compliance costs, staffing requirements, and restrictions on innovation.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cfigure class=\\\"wp-block-embed\\\"\\u003e\\u003cdiv class=\\\"wp-block-embed__wrapper\\\"\\u003e\\u003ciframe src=\\\"https://www.youtube.com/embed/oaIk7TD5Yjg\\\" loading=\\\"lazy\\\" allow=\\\"accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share\\\" referrerpolicy=\\\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\\\" allowfullscreen\\u003e\\u003c/iframe\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003c/figure\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe video highlights concerns with provisions often associated with the Railway Safety Act, including two-person crew mandates and expanded regulatory requirements. While advocates argue these measures are necessary to prevent accidents, the video notes that freight rail companies already face significant financial incentives to prioritize safety, including the costs associated with derailments, insurance claims, cargo losses, and reputational damage.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe video also places the debate in historical context, noting that rail deregulation efforts beginning under President Jimmy Carter helped create a more efficient and financially sustainable freight rail system. Greater flexibility allowed railroads to invest in infrastructure, improve service, and strengthen supply chains.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe broader economic implications are significant. When rail transportation becomes less efficient or more expensive, freight often shifts to trucks, increasing highway congestion, road wear, and overall transportation costs.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eUltimately, the video argues that the debate should not be framed as safety versus no safety. Instead, policymakers should focus on identifying the most effective ways to improve safety while preserving the flexibility, innovation, and efficiency that make freight rail an essential part of the American economy.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch3 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eKey Takeaway\\u003c/h3\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe question is not whether railroads should be safe—they must be. The question is whether one-size-fits-all federal mandates are the best way to achieve that goal, or whether they risk increasing costs and slowing innovation without delivering meaningful safety improvements.\\u003c/p\\u003e\",\"text\":\"\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003een \\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cfigure class=\\\"wp-block-image\\\"\\u003e\\u003ca class=\\\"td-modal-image\\\" href=\\\"https://uspolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/maxresdefault.jpg\\\"\\u003e\\u003cimg decoding=\\\"async\\\" src=\\\"https://uspolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/maxresdefault-696x392.jpg\\\" alt=\\\"\\\" title=\\\"maxresdefault\\\"/\\u003e\\u003c/a\\u003e\\u003c/figure\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eAs lawmakers continue debating rail policy, a new video from US Policy examines an important question: Do additional federal regulations make railroads safer, or do they primarily increase costs and reduce efficiency?\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eUsing a model train set to illustrate the point, the video explores how each new mandate can add friction to the freight system through compliance costs, staffing requirements, and restrictions on innovation.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cfigure class=\\\"wp-block-embed\\\"\\u003e\\u003cdiv class=\\\"wp-block-embed__wrapper\\\"\\u003e\\u003ciframe src=\\\"https://www.youtube.com/embed/oaIk7TD5Yjg\\\" loading=\\\"lazy\\\" allow=\\\"accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share\\\" referrerpolicy=\\\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\\\" allowfullscreen\\u003e\\u003c/iframe\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003c/figure\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe video highlights concerns with provisions often associated with the Railway Safety Act, including two-person crew mandates and expanded regulatory requirements. While advocates argue these measures are necessary to prevent accidents, the video notes that freight rail companies already face significant financial incentives to prioritize safety, including the costs associated with derailments, insurance claims, cargo losses, and reputational damage.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe video also places the debate in historical context, noting that rail deregulation efforts beginning under President Jimmy Carter helped create a more efficient and financially sustainable freight rail system. Greater flexibility allowed railroads to invest in infrastructure, improve service, and strengthen supply chains.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe broader economic implications are significant. When rail transportation becomes less efficient or more expensive, freight often shifts to trucks, increasing highway congestion, road wear, and overall transportation costs.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eUltimately, the video argues that the debate should not be framed as safety versus no safety. Instead, policymakers should focus on identifying the most effective ways to improve safety while preserving the flexibility, innovation, and efficiency that make freight rail an essential part of the American economy.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003ch3 class=\\\"wp-block-heading\\\"\\u003eKey Takeaway\\u003c/h3\\u003e\\n\\n\\n\\n\\u003cp class=\\\"wp-block-paragraph\\\"\\u003eThe question is not whether railroads should be safe—they must be. The question is whether one-size-fits-all federal mandates are the best way to achieve that goal, or whether they risk increasing costs and slowing innovation without delivering meaningful safety improvements.\\u003c/p\\u003e\"}}],\"version\":\"2.30.0\"}",1782708114,"https://hl-file.8kds.com/admin/b8212f36b31c4478be781f374b0a8a49.png","test-2",1782734705,{"id":112,"author":5,"title":113,"content":114,"classTypeId":115,"classTypeName":116,"publishTime":117,"coverImg":118,"pageTitle":5,"slug":5,"permalink":112,"authorAvatar":5,"authorBio":5,"createBy":119,"updateDate":117},"2066760608567316480","顺便说一下啊哎呀比简直互相关于热咬","commodo nostrud",16,"china-16",1782728884,"https://loremflickr.com/400/400?lock=4538268718232799",-1,7,[]]